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Abstract
The Law of One Price is a dated but still a puzzling economic concept. Stud-
ies that found violations of the Law are frequent and numerous, although
scholars have pointed that failures of the Law are likely to be due to lack
of informative datasets. In addition, for storable commodities, the possible
interactions of spatial and temporal arbitrage may hide the implications of
the Law, invalidating the conclusions of the studies. Based on a simplified
two-market model of spatio-temporal arbitrage, I review the implications of
the Law of One Price and test for them with a rich dataset of weekly prices
of storable commodities, and information on transaction costs, trade and
storage. I conclude that most of the statements implied by the Law of One
Price are indeed not empirically violated.
Keywords: Arbitrage, Quantile, Storage, Trade, Transaction Cost.
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Price dynamics, LOP and quantile regressions
Introduction
Arbitrage has been intuitively defined as the possibility to make a profit in
a financial market without risk and without net investment of capital (Del-
baen and Schachermayer, 2006). It implies that the prices for a commodity
marketed in different areas will converge.
There are two types of arbitrage: the spatial arbitrage is the core of the
Law of One Price (Fackler and Goodwin, 2001); the temporal arbitrage is key
in competitive storage models (Williams and Wright, 2005). The Law of One
Price (LOP) defines markets as the spaces within which the price of a good
tends toward uniformity, allowance being made for transaction costs (Stigler
1966 cited in Fackler and Goodwin 2001, p.974). The role of transaction
costs is crucial but still puzzling and responsible for numerous violations of
the Law (Goodwin, 1990; Fackler and Goodwin, 2001; Steinwender, 2018).
Indeed, the LOP has been violated more than any other economic law (e.g.
Lamont and Thaler, 2003; Crucini et al., 2010; Gopinath et al., 2011). A
vast majority of empirical studies rely only on price data, and it plausible
to conclude that the violations are due to the inability of making inference
using a single variable (the price) that embed all information deriving from
the market fundamentals. Despite several empirical, sophisticated, methods
have been adopted to validate the LOP (e.g. Richardson, 1978; Ardeni,
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1989; Goodwin and Piggot, 2001; Engel and Rogers, 2001; Taylor, 2001;
Gopinath et al., 2011; Novy, 2013; Sanetramo, 2015; Goodwin et al., 2018),
the empirical validity of the LOP is still debated.
Ignoring trade flows and transportation costs (also induced by policy
interventions) may lead to weak results on market integration (Goodwin
et al., 1990; Miljkovic, 1999; Lence et al., 2018; Antonioli and Santeramo,
2022). As well argued by Barrett (2001), the improved statistical methods of
price analysis cannot compensate for the absence of essential information.
Fackler and Goodwin (2001, p. 978) argue that, because the LOP relies
on an equilibrium concept, the violation of the theory could be due to an
unstable trading relationship or to a disequilibrium situation. It is therefore
important to tests for the validity of the LOP with larger set of information.
The existing literature has left underinvestigated another issue: the effects
of temporal arbitrage. The two arbitrage forces (temporal and spatial) have
different implications for price dynamics (e.g. Goodwin et al., 2002), and
therefore should be both taken into account when testing for the validity of
the LOP.
Starting from the above mentioned debate, the present analysis investi-
gate the empirical validity of the LOP, for separated markets, when storage
and trade occur.
The proposed tests are admittedly simple, but indeed they require an
informative dataset, with data on trade, storage and transaction costs. The
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tests are coupled with a quantile regressions approach which allows me to
conclude on price dynamics and arbitrage opportunities.
The contribution of the present paper is (at least) twofold: first, I use a
rich dataset that has a relatively higher frequency (i.e. weekly) for price data
and information on transaction costs, trade flows and stock levels; second,
I propose a novel econometric approaches, beyond the state-of-art in the
price transmission literature, that allows me to conclude on price dynamics
and to suggest directions for future research. In addition, the conceptual
framework emphazies the importance of considereing two ”inactivity bands”
(rather than one) in the price transmission analyses.
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A simple conceptual framework
Testing for the validity of the LOP is not trivial. As pointed by Goodwin
et al. (1990) and Barrett (2001), it would be wise to enrich the econometric
models of price transmission with more information, other than price. A
simple formulation fo the LOP is as follows:
Absence of Arbitrage Opportunities ⇒ |E[P i]− E[P j ]| ≤
Transaction costs
where the E[P ] stands for expected price, the markets are labelled as i
and j, and the transaction costs include trade, storage, and all other costs
incurred by traders.
More precisely, the LOP implies that expected prices are at the bound-
aries of the (spatial and temporal) arbitrage costs band if trade and storage
take place, and at the boundaries of the spatial (i.e. trade) arbitrage costs
band if only trade occurs. These conditions define two ”inactivity bands”i
and allows depict two stylized facts: a) price differences fall outside the
larger ”inactivity band” if neither spatial not temporal arbitrage are occur-
ring; b) price differences fall within the smaller ”inactivity band” if trade is
not profitable (and possibly only storage occurs).
In order to conclude on the validity of the LOP in this context, I define
iThe literature on price transmission refers to only one ”inactivity band”, defined as
the maximum price differences that trigger spatial arbitrage activity.
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different regimes according to the activities of spatial and temporal arbi-
trage. Few (weak) assumptions on expectations, price dynamics, markets
and costs structure are required: rational arbitrageurs forecast prices based
on available informationii; trade and storage are costly, and trade to dis-
tant markets is more expensive than storing in the domestic marketiii I also
assume that trade takes one (or more) period(s) to occuriv.
The above assumptions and the spatial and temporal arbitrage condi-
tions allow me to define three regimes: the first regime (I) comprises both
spatial and temporal arbitrage; the second regime (II) occurs if temporal
arbitrage is in place, while spatial arbitrage is absent; the third regime (III)
is defined by the absence of arbitrage (either temporal and spatial).
In the first regime trade and storage occur and prices are expected to
differ by less than trade costs (i.e. price differences fall within the smaller
”inactivity band”). Spatial arbitrage (i.e. trade) exists until profitable op-
portunities are fully exploited. The joint effect of trade and storage results in
iiMore technically, without loss of generalization, hereafter, I define i to be the export
market, and j to be the import market. Rational arbitrageurs, based on their information





with νt ∼ ξ(0, σ
2) and E[νt, νt−1] = 0, where νt represents the one-period ahead forecast
error (cfr. Cumby and Obstfeld, 1981). More generally, if storage or trade contracts take
place over multiple periods, say p, forecast errors serially correlated up to p − 1 periods
are coherent with the LOP (cfr. Cumby and Obstfeld, 1981)
iiiAs in Coleman (2009), trade costs (T) exceed storage costs (k), there is no capacity
limitation in trade and storage, and storage costs are constant (Tt > kt = k̄, ∀t > 0). It
should be noted that if storage was more costly than trade it would never be profitable to
trade and store at the same time (Coleman, 2009).
ivI recognize that if trade takes more time, price dynamics may differ (cfr. Goodwin
e al., 1990) and, in particular, we would observe lagged price responses to large price
differentials. In the empirical setting, I use different specifications to allow for lagged
adjustments up to four periods. Further exploration in this direction is left as future step.
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a low (or null) autocorrelation of the price differencesv. On the other hand,
temporal arbitrage is able to induce high price serial correlation (Cafiero
et al., 2011): prices of storable goods are expected to be serially correlated
when storage is positive, but serial correlation cannot be explained by the
competitive storage model during stockouts. I expect to observe non-zero
correlation when storage is positive, and lower (or zero) correlation during
stockoutsvi.
Lastly, if arbitrage occurs, I expect arbitrage opportunities to be ex-
ploited and therefore, I expect to find an high speed of price differences
reversion to the band in the regime with trade, with a speed that should
increase with the magnitude of arbitrage opportunities.
The empirical identification of the price regimes relies on the observed
level of trade across market and on the storage activities in the export mar-
ketvii. The definitions of regimes rule out endogeneity issues that may arise
vFew words of caution are needed. In fact, as thankfully pointed by a referee, an-
other source of autocorrelation (not dismantled by spatial arbitrage) may be due to the
autocorrelation of the trading costs
viIndeed, in the empirical analysis I define the years with no (further) storage activities
as those in which the level of storage is lower than the one observed in the previous year.
For instance, if in 2004, 2005 and 2006 the storage levels are, respectively, 1000, 1200,
and 1100 tonnes, the year 2005 will be defined as one with (further) storage activities
(S2005 > 0), whereas the year 2006 will be defined as a year without (further) storage
activities (S2006 = 0). While, as pointed by a reviewer, a lower storage level does not
imply stockout, which occurs only when the level of storage is zero, the adopted approach
is conservative. If findings are found with a conservative approach is legitimate to conclude
that including years with a level of storage equal to zero would confirm, and exacerbate,
the results.
viiTrade reversal is allowed and observed in the data. However, the focus is on the normal
course of arbitrage activities and therefore I rule out trade reversal by excluding from the
analysis the periods in which trade reversals occur. Therefore, analytically, regimes one,
two and three, do not include periods with trade reversal. Similarly, I do not consider
storage activities in the import market. As argued by Coleman (2009), storage in the
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if, differently, regimes would have been defined as function of price levels or
price dynamicsviii.
The presence of spatial and temporal arbitrage defines the first regime:
expected price differences should equate the expected transaction costs, net
of storage costs. Put differently, the expected price differences minus the
expected arbitrage costs (trade costs and storage costs) should be (on aver-
age) zero. Also, according to the LOP, price differences should fall within
the smaller inactivity band (defined by trade costs). As for the price se-
rial correlation, we have contrasting effects: the spatial arbitrage tends to
eliminate price serial correlation, whereas the temporal arbitrage induces
serial correlation. Assessing the net effect on price serial correlation is an
empirical question which depends on the prevailing force (the high correla-
tion induced by the temporal arbitrage or the zero correlation implied by
the spatial arbitrage).
The presence of temporal arbitrage, and the absence of spatial arbitrage
defines the second regime. The temporal arbitrage implies that price differ-
ences should not exceed the expected storage costs. In addition, if trade is
not occurring, price differences are expected to differ by less than the spatial
arbitrage costs. Therefore, when storage is positive and trade is absent I
expect to observe price differences to be less than the net arbitrage costs
import market should never be profitable is trade exist. These stringent conditions allow
me to make the empirical analysis tightly connected to the theoretical implications of the
Law of One Price.
viiiIn particular, Lence et al. (2018) show that when regimes are defined as function of
price differentials the inference on arbitrage activities tends to be poor.
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(spatial arbitrage costs minus temporal arbitrage costs). Price differences
falling within the inactivity band, and serial correlation would be consistent
with the LOP.
The absence of temporal and spatial arbitrage defines the third regime.
When temporal and spatial arbitrage are not occurring, price differences
may exceed or not trade costs net of arbitrage costs, due to unexpected
demand rises and convenience yield (Brennan, 1976). In fact price differences
may spread less than the full carrying charges, due to the convenience yield
(Kaldor, 1976). The convenience yield is low when stocks are abundant, but
it is positive when stocks are low. However, exactly because of convenience
yield, large differences in prices may be not exploited by arbitrageurs. In
fact, the usefulness of holding stocks may be motivated by the convenience
of delaying the provision of goods, or to answer to unexpected demand
rises, and to insure the continuity of exploitation. Therefore the absence of
arbitrage (either temporal and spatial) may be due either to the absence of
profitable arbitrage opportunities (i.e. the price in the export market is not
expected to rise, and the price in the import market differ from the price of
the export market by less than trade costs), or to the physical absence of the
product (i.e. the price in the export market is expected to rise but there is
no product left for storage, or the price in the import market differ from the
price of the export market by more than trade costs but no product can be
traded). Thus, in the third regime, two opposite cases would be consistent
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with the LOP: price differences are less than trade costs minus storage costs;
price differences exceed trade costs. Lastly, the absence of trade and storage
does not allow one to conclude on serial correlation, therefore either zero or
positive serial correlation are consistent with the LOP.
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Empirical strategy
In order to evaluate the implications of the arbitrage conditions, I construct
the variable profitable trade which equals the logarithm of the ratio of price
differences over (freight rate) trade costs:






where Pj and Pi are, respectively, the (spot) price in the import and
export locations. The above expression is valid when traders have perfect
foresights, or (more realistically) when a large amount of trade is contracted
before shipping. In fact, when E[πTt ] is greater than zero the expected profit
from trade is positive exactly because the price differences are larger than
the trade costs. Conversely, if the variable E[πTt ] is less than zero, trading
is not profitable. The variable described above is strictly related to the find-
ings of the literature on price transmission: E[πTt ] > 0 indicates that price
differences are in the outer regime (i.e. prices deviate from their long-run
relationships), while E[πTt ] < 0 indicates that price differences fall in the
inside regime. The logarithimic transformation implies that positive and
negative values are, respectively, indicators of profitable and non profitable
spatial arbitrage. In addition, the log-form allows to interpret regression
coefficients as elasticitiesix. The arbitrage activities may restore the equilib-
rium after one or more periods (Goodwin et al., 1990), and therefore prices
ixA word of caution is necessary: the proposed measure provides a benchmark to in-
terpret the results, but should not be taken as theoretical foundation for the derivation
(one-to-one) of the empirical model.
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adjustments require time. I generalize the variable profitable trade by allow-
ing up to p periods for arbitrage adjustments to take place. Hereafter, I will
use the notation profitable trade 4 to indicate that the price adjustments
require four periods to occur. The variable profitable trade will be used
to evaluate how price differences are distributed with respect to the arbi-
trage costs, if and how they are serially correlated, and to conclude on how
profitable arbitrage opportunities tend to be eliminated through arbitrage.
Let me elaborate on the general strategy implemented in this paper.
Preliminarily, I evaluate, through non-parametric tests, if the price differ-
ences have similar median values and similar distributions across the three
regimes. If spatial and temporal arbitrage act in a similar way, price dif-
ferences will have similar median values and similar distribution. Indeed, I
expect to find that medians differ and that price differences are distributed
differently across regimes. This preliminary step allows me to establish if
the arbitrage alters levels and distributions of the price differences. So, first,
I evaluate if price differences tend to be equal or smaller than the arbitrage
costs, and compare the median values through a semi-parametric regression:
the median regression (Koenker, 2005). Second, I evaluate the serial correla-
tion in price differences by applying the test for autocorrelation proposed by
Cumby and Huizinga (1992). Third, I evaluate whether the arbitrage tends
to eliminate profitable opportunities. The analysis is conducted through a
quantile autoregressive model (Koenker and Xiao, 2006): when arbitrage
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is occurring, profitable opportunities (proxied by the positive values of the
variable profitable trade) should be quickly exploited; moreover, the larger
the arbitrage opportunities (i.e. the larger the values of profitable trade),
the faster the elimination of such opportunities should be. All in all, the
analysis allows me to characterize how the price dynamics are altered by
the temporal and spatial arbitrage, and how the arbitrage eliminates (un-
exploited) profitable opportunities.
Formal non-parametric tests of equality of median values and equal dis-
tribution are applied. The Kruskal-Wallis test is a rank sum statistics that
allows one to test for equality of median values across different samples. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is a non-parametric test of equality of probability
distributions. The test quantifies the distance between the empirical cumu-
lative distribution function (CDF) of two different samples, and it may be
used to evaluate the distance (and optential statistically significant differ-
ences) with respect to the CDF of a reference distribution.
The median regression (a robust techniques with respect to outliers)
has been adopted to evaluate whether the price differences tend to exceed
arbitrage costs. The median regression, QE [π
T
t ](0.5) = θ0(0.5), is solved






where α is the estimated median value, and the E[πTt ] is the profitable
trade variable. Koenker (2005) argues that the median autoregression is a
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strongly consistent estimator for the median value. In my framework the
median regression indicates if price differences tend to be larger (positive co-
efficient) or smaller (negative coefficient) than the arbitrage costs. In order
to evaluate the dynamics of price differences, I adopt the test of serial corre-
lation proposed by Cumby and Huizinga (1992). Under the null hypothesis
the time series have a moving average, while the alternative hypotheses is
that autocorrelations of the time series are nonzero at lags greater than the
specified one.
Finally, I estimate a quantile autoregression model (Koenker and Xiao,
2006) able to capture the ”local” dynamics of the price series (i.e. local
stationary or local unit-root behavior), and therefore to underline the speed
at which deviations from the long-run equilibrium revert to the equilibrium.
I estimate the model on the whole sample and on two sub-samples of pos-
itive and negative values. The estimates on the entire sample allow me to
conclude on the global behavior of price series, while the the estimates on
positive values will allow to conclude on how profitable arbitrage opportu-
nities of different magnitudes are differently exploited. The autoregressive
model is as follows:
QE[πTt ]
(τ |QE[πTt ]t−1) = θ0(τ) + θ1(τ)E[π
T
t ]t−1
where τ is the quantile at which the model is evaluated, θ0 and θ1 are
the estimated coefficients with the inverse of 1 - θ1 representing the speed of
reversion, and h = ln(0.5)
ln ˆ(θ1)
representing the half life (the number of periods
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required to achieve a 50 % adjustment toward the equilibrium). I consider
three values of τ : 0.25, 0.5 and 0.75. Due to the limited number of ob-
servations per regime, I estimate the quantile autoregression specification
using a system of three equations. In addition, I compute the interquan-
tiles coefficient ([.25-.75]) and test for statistical significance. Intuitively, the
larger profitable arbitrage opportunities should be exploited faster than the
smaller ones, and therefore the higher the quantile, the faster the reversion
of price differentials should be. The quantile autoregression model should
reveal lower estimated coefficients θ1) at higher quantiles and therefore I
expect quantile coefficients to follow a concave function. Put differently, I
expect to find θ1(0.75) < θ1(0.5) < θ1(0.25) so that the larger the profit
opportunities, the faster their elimination (via arbitrage) should be (Figure
1).
The specification I adopt shares analogies with the threshold cointegra-
tion model proposed by Balke and Fomby (1997). Let me elaborate more
on the intuition by presenting the analogy that my approach shares with
the threshold cointegration model of price transmission. The positive values
of the variable Profitabe trade (E[πTt ]
+) are those allocated in the outside
regime of the threshold cointegration model in that the positive values imply
that the differences in prices exceed the transaction costs. Conversely, the
negative values of the variable Profitabe trade (E[πTt ]
−) corresponds to the
observations allocated in the inside regime of the threshold cointegration
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model (Figure 2). Given this analogy, the coefficients of the threshold quan-
tile autoregression model (θ1) are inversely related to the speed of reversion:
if θ1 converges to zero, the mean reversion is immediate, and therefore the
arbitrage opportunities are exploited immediately; if θ1 converges to one
, the local persistence is strong and therefore the arbitrage opportunities
tend to last longer; if θ1 is above one the time series show a locally explo-
sive tendency which would imply that the arbitrage opportunities tend to
be increased by further opportunities. Again, the coefficients can be easily
interpreted as by considering the speed of reversion an the half lives.
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Data
Prices have been extracted from the International Grain Council (IGC)
which provides export prices for several grain commodities. Export prices
are free on board (fob) and quoted in US $ per tonnes. The export prices are
nearest position, so they are indicative and do not constitute actual market
price (IGC, 2014).
Among the price series available from the IGC, I have selected the prices
of three commodities (wheat, barley and rice) for which data related to
a similar type of commodity were available at different locations. I have
therefore excluded the series that contains a large share of missing values.
More specifically, the dataset includes freight rates (priced in US $ per
tonnes) for the following markets: US Gulf (USA), Rouen (France) and
Hamburg (Germany) for wheat; Adelaide (Australia), Rouen and Hamburg
for barley; Bangkok (Thailand), Chi Minh (Vietnam) and Karachi (Pak-
istan) for rice. Data span for a ten years period, from April 2005 to May
2014, and are available at weekly frequency. The dataset contains no miss-
ing or few missing data for three price series (0.8% for Australian price of
barley, 2.5% for German price of barley, and 5.2% for Vietnamese price of
rice) which have been opportunely treated through interpolation.
The dataset also includes, for the selected countries and commodities,
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information on the annual stock levels collected from the USDA and on the
monthly trade flows, collected from the UNCOMTRADE database.
Empirical Results
The preliminary analysis shows that the three regimes are not always oc-
curring for the six markets pairs (table 1). In addition, the regimes contain
a limited number of observations in that I exclude years in which trade is
observed in both directions. As a result, in four out of six cases I identify
only two out of three regimes. The share of price differences exceeding the
freight costs is generally larger in regime one than in regimes two and three;
the maximum number of consecutive deviations (i.e. the number of consec-
utive periods in which price differences have exceeded freight rate costs) is
larger in regime one with respect to the regimes two and three: deviations
are more likely to be reported when trade is occurring. The medians and
the distributions of price differences are different across regimes (tables 2
and 3). In particular the null hypotheses of equal medians (Kruskal-Wallis
test) and of equal distribution (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) are rejected more
often when the regimes one and two are compared to the regime three: the
arbitrage alters the distribution of price differences. The results are more
evident when I allow for a longer adjustment period (i.e. using the variable
profitable trade 4). The type of arbitrage (spatial or temporal) does matter:
it alters proportional differences and their distributions.
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The median regression analysis shows that in most cases the LOP is not
violated: when spatial or temporal arbitrage is occurring prices tend to differ
by less than arbitrage costs, as implied by the LOP. Interestingly, for rice,
price differences tend to be much larger than arbitrage costs. A deeper in-
vestigation reveals that when direct trade is conspicuous in both directionsx
price differences are less likely to differ by less than arbitrage cost. Intu-
itively, this suggests that, in these cases, goods movements through trade
causes deviations from the equilibrium, rather than helping to restore the
equilibrium conditions. Conversely, when direct trade is mainly unilateral
(as for barley and wheat pairs), the implications of the LOP are well satisfied
in that price differences are smaller than the arbitrage costs. Therefore, in
order to conclude on the LOP, the median regression needs to be interpreted
jointly with data on direct trade.
The tests of serial correlation also confirm the implications of the LOP.
In particular the null hypothesis of no serial correlation at four lags of the
test by Cumby and Huizinga (1992) cannot be rejected in regime I for most
market pairs. The implications of the LOP are more evident when I allow
for a longer adjustment period in that in regime I the presence of temporal
arbitrage induces serial correlation. In Regime II, I should reject the null
hypothesis in that the absence of trade, and the presence of storage suggest
that price difference may be serially correlated. Indeed, I find that price
xThis is the case, for wheat markets, for France-USA pair, and, for rice, for the
Pakistan-Vietnam and the Pakistan-Thailand pairs.
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differences are serially correlated only for few periods (i.e. I reject the null
of no serial correlation at one lag, but fail to reject at four lags). This is
not surprising in that storage is linking prices of the same market over time,
but it does not link prices of spatially separated markets. Therefore, again,
price differences are serially correlated only in the very short run. Similarly,
serial correlation for price differences dies out after few periods when spatial
arbitrage and temporal arbitrage are absent in that prices are linked by
no arbitrage forces. The results are not very dissimilar across markets. A
further evidence of the role of arbitrage on serial correlation come from the
analysis on the whole sample: the null hypothesis of no serial correlation is
rejected very often. Differently, when arbtrage is considered, the differences
on serial correlation are detected. In short, the price differences tend to not
be serially correlated when spatial arbitrage is occurring: spatial arbitrage
tends to eliminate serial correlation. The presence of storage induces serial
correlation in price differences for very few periods. Again, interpreting the
analyses with trade and storage data, as well as with data on transaction
costs, is important to conclude on the validity of the LOP.
As for the quantile autoregression model, a statistical significant autore-
gressive coefficient (lower than one in absolute value) would suggest that
arbitrage opportunities are gradually eliminated: the smaller the coefficient
(in absolute terms) the faster the elimination of arbitrage opportunities will
be (figures 1 and 2). Arbitrage opportunities tend to be exploited. How-
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ever, trade facilitates the elimination of profitable arbitrage opportunities
while storage makes it less likely to occur. In few cases the estimated coeffi-
cients exceed one, indicating that arbitrage opportunities are not exploited
(and indeed favor further opportunities of profitable arbitrage). However,
these exceptions are related to lower quantiles (.25), thus they are related
to small arbitrage opportunities. In addition, the local unit roots (i.e. the
local explosive behavior) is more evident in the three cases in which trade
is bilateralxi: reasonably, it is relatively more difficult to make profitable
arbitrage if it is need to forecast incoming and outgoing trade flows, than
forecasting only outgoing trade flows.
As far the speed at which profitable opportunities are exploited, the co-
efficients tend to decrease monotonically from the lower (0.25) to the higher
(0.75) quantile: larger deviations are eliminated faster than small ones. In-
tuitively a large deviation means that the arbitrage opportunities are large,
and this is likely to attract a large number of arbitrageurs, and profitable
opportunities are soon exploited. While these results are evident in table 7,
there is an even stronger evidence when I compute half lives (table 8). The
differences in estimates across quantiles (.25-.75) are statistically significant
(see columns 5 of table 7): the price dynamics are different at different levels
of price spreads. The negative sign for the interquantiles estimate suggests
that large arbitrage opportunities tend to be exploited faster than smaller
xiAgain, this is the case, for wheat markets, for France-USA pair, and, for rice, for the
Pakistan-Vietnam and the Pakistan-Thailand pairs.
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ones in that the coefficients estimated at lower quantiles (.25) is larger than
the coefficients estimated at higher quantiles (.75). By limiting the esti-
mates to the outside regime the results are unaltered: when statistically
significant, the interquantiles estimate is negative, so the coefficients esti-
mated at lower quantiles (.25) are larger than the coefficients estimated at
higher quantiles (.75)xii. Again, a richer set of information is important to
empirically validate of the LOP.
xiiIndeed, the same evidence is also found for the inside regime.
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Concluding remarks
The empirical validity of the Law of One Price has been doubted and chal-
lenged numerous times. Complex statistical analyses may fail to be con-
clusive due to the lack of informative datasets (Barrett, 2001). A second
important issue is that the validity of the LOP has been usually investigated
ignoring the potential implications of different arbitrage regimes induced by
the presence (or absence) of trade and storage. In order to revise the va-
lidity of the statements of the LOP, I review the implications of the Law,
and use a rich dataset which includes weekly data on prices and transaction
costs, as well as data on trade flows and stock levels. I use non-parametric
tests and quantile regressions to highlight the price dynamics when arbi-
trage is occurring, and to conclude on the validity of the Law. As pointed
by Goodwin et al. (1990), the inclusion of data on transaction costs results
in a lower tendency to detect violations of the Law of One Price. I found
similar evidence. Most of the statements of the LOP are confirmed. First, I
found that the price differences tend to be smaller than the arbitrage costs
when arbitrage is occurring. Second, the serial correlation in price differ-
ences, observed throughout the entire sample, is less evident when spatial
arbitrage is occurring, and it dies out in few weeks. Third, the arbitrage
tends to eliminate unexploited profit opportunities, and the larger profit op-
portunities are exploited quicker than the smaller opportunities, especially
when the spatial arbitrage is occurring.
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Several key messages may be derived from the present analysis: first, the
empirical validity of the Law may be better proved when the statistical infer-
ence is coupled with the observations of data on trade and storage; second,
the quantile regression is a promising tool to investigate price dynamics and,
in particular, to deepen on the persistency of arbitrage opportunities (i.e.
usually detected as violations of the LOP) that may arise during stockouts
or excess of exports; third, the quantile autoregression is a useful tool to in-
vestigate price dynamics in abnormal situations (e.g. when price differences
are very low, or very high) and should be adopted in future research.
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On spatio-temporal arbitrage conditions
I describe arbitrage behavior when trade and storage are feasible options.
Traders and stores are assumed to be price-takers, and to hold rational
expectations based on the available information. Profit-seeking agents will
exploit arbitrage opportunities arising from spatial or temporal disequilibria.
I describe the behavior of forward looking agents at time t + 1. Spa-
tial arbitrage conditions imply that, in expectation, prices of homogeneous
goods in two separated markets may differ at most by the transaction costs
necessary to reallocate the goods from the relatively good-abundant market
to the good-scarce market. I assume that trade takes time: specifically if
traders commit in period t to ship a good to the other market, the good will
be marketed in the destination market at time t + 1 (cfr. previous studies
such as Goodwin et al., 1990; Coleman, 2009). The arbitrage conditions can
















t |Ωt] for X
ij
t > 0
where E[·] is the expectation operator, P it and P
j
t are the prices in market
i and j, Et[T
ij
t ] are expected unit cost to ship from i to j at time t, X
ij
t is
the quantity traded from i to j, Ωt is the information set
xiii. Transaction
costs (at time t) are known by informed agents. Without loss of generality
I assume that P it < P
j




t = Tt, thus Et[T
ij
t |Ωt] = Tt.
Therefore agents will face no uncertainty on expected prices at the final
location, although the expected prices will differ from the realized price
for a ”forecast” error term (ǫPt
iid
∼ (0, σ2)), assumed to be iid with zero
meanxiv. Notationally this means that Et[P
i
t+1|Ωt] = Pt+1 + ǫ
P
t+1, that is
price expectations differ by realized price for a zero mean error term. In a
more compact notation, we may rewrite the trade arbitrage conditions for





t+1|Ωt]− Tt) ·Xt = 0
where Xt represents the traded quantity. Since there is no reason to
transfer goods among the two locations if there is not a price gap, conditions
(1) and (2) suggest that trade will not occur if prices differ by less than
transaction costs. This implies that prices will tend to move toward the
boundaries of the (expected) ”transaction costs band” if trade is occurring,
xiiiThe model assumes that information is available regardless the location of traders.
Allow for different information sets is feasible, and left as future advance.
xivThe model can easily incorporate uncertainty in transaction costs.
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while they will have no relationships if trade is not occurring.
Temporal arbitrage conditions implies that the expected (and discounted)










t |Ωt] = Et[kt|Ωt] for St > 0
where kt represents the cost to store goods for one period, δ is the de-
preciation rate, r is the interest rate, St is the quantity stored. The net
interest rate will be r − δ. I assume that kt is the same for locations i and
j and it is constant over time (kt = k ∀t > 0). Noting that Et[P
i
t |Ωt] = P
i
t ,
and Et[kt|Ωt] = kt = k, the expressions 4 and 5 greatly simplify. In sum, I
only assume that storage costs and expected future prices are known, while
realized future prices are uncertainxv.
Since there is no reason to store goods if prices are not expected to
rise faster than the net interest rate and by more than the storage costs,
conditions (4) and (5) suggest that storage will not occur if prices at time
t+1 and time t are expected to differ by less than storage costsxvi. To have





t − k) · St = 0
This implies that (virtually) prices at different timing (t and t+ 1) will
move within the boundaries of the ”storage costs band” if storage is zero,
and (in expectation) the first-order difference (E[∆Pt+1] ≡ Et[Pt+1 − Pt])
will equal k if storage takes place.
Different from spatial arbitrage that allows transfer of goods in both
directions (from market i to market j and vice-versa), temporal arbitrage
allows to transfer goods only in one direction (from period t to period t+1).
In both cases arbitrageurs are profit-seeking agents, so spatial and temporal
arbitrage will be substitutes strategiesxviii.
Assuming that transaction costs are constant over time (Tt = T ∀ t > 0),





t+1|Ωt]| ≤ T for Xt > 0
However, as long as T > k, that is spatial arbitrage is more costly than
temporal arbitrage, it will be not profitable to store the imported good.
xvFor simplicity we set r and δ equal zero. The results are not sensitive to this as-
sumption, which is in line with literature on storage (cfr. Wright and Williams, 1984).
Moreover, we assume there will not be convenience yield.
xviRecall that r = δ = 0.
xviiFor simplicity we only write them for market i.
xviiiIn particular, as shown by Miranda and Glauber (1995), trade is at least partial
substitute for storage, while the opposite is not true. Thus trade reduces storage, while
the opposite is not necessarily true.
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t+1|Ωt]| ≤ T − k for Xt > 0 and St > 0
Based on these arbitrage conditions I derive propositions implied by the
LOP and evaluate the validity of the LOP under different trade and storage
regimes.
xixThis result is also shown by Coleman (2009)
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Number of deviations per regime
Markets pair Regime I Regime II Regime III
X > 0, S > 0 X = 0, S > 0 X = 0, S = 0
Wheat: FRA - USA 52 52 na
[44.2%] [22] [46.1%] [21]
Wheat: GER - USA na 138 na
[14.4%] [17]
Barley: FRA - AUS 52 152 307
[46.2%] [7] [13.3%] [9] [51.0%] [15]
Barley: GER - AUS na 203 305
[5.2%] [4] [9.6%] [11]
Rice: PAK - VIE 52 103 46
[86.5%] [29] [49.5%] [16] [44.2%] [18]
Rice: PAK - THA 104 na 12
[80.7%] [76] [19.2%] [5]
FRA, USA, GER, AUS, PAK and VIE stand, repectively, for France, United States
of America, Germany, Australia, Pakistan and Vietnam. na stands for not available.
The first line of the table reports the number of observations per each regime, while in
squared parentheses are reported the percentage of price differences exceeding freight
rate costs, and the maximum number of consecutive deviations (i.e. price differences
exceeding freight rate costs
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Table 2: Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test
Markets pair Adjustment All Sample I vs II I vs III II vs III
Wheat: FRA - USA 1 week .468 .339
4 weeks .425 .779
Wheat: GER - USA 1 week
4 weeks
Barley: FRA - AUS 1 week .001 .159 .557 .000
4 weeks .001 .002 .547 .001
Barley: GER - AUS 1 week .001 .001
4 weeks .001 .001
Rice: PAK - VIE 1 week .001 .115 .011 .058
4 weeks .001 .007 .135 .001
Rice: PAK - THA 1 week .000 .000
4 weeks .001 .000
N. of rejections 1 week 4 out of 5 0 out of 3 1 out of 3 2 out of 3
N. of rejections 4 weeks 4 out of 5 2 out of 3 1 out of 3 3 out of 3
Overall share of rejections 1/4 weeks 66.6% 33.3% 33.3% 62.5%
The number of rejections refers to a 10% significance level.
.
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Table 3: Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution
functions
Markets pair Adjustment I vs II I vs III II vs III
Wheat: FRA - USA 1 week .417
4 weeks .349
Wheat: GER - USA 1 week
4 weeks
Barley: FRA - AUS 1 week .103 .458 .000
4 weeks .004 .607 .000
Barley: GER - AUS 1 week .001
4 weeks .001
Rice: PAK - VIE 1 week .011 .001 .021
4 weeks .000 .252 .000
Rice: PAK - THA 1 week .000 na
4 weeks .000
N. of rejections 1 week 0 out of 3 2 out of 3 2 out of 3
N. of rejections 4 weeks 2 out of 3 1 out of 3 3 out of 3
Overall share of rejections 1/4 weeks 33.3 % 50 % 62.5 %
The number of rejections refers to a 10% significance level.
Table 4: Median regression analysis
Markets pair Regime I Regime II Regime III
Wheat: FRA - USA -.095 .268+ .039 .041
[.115] [.146] [.136] [.154]
Wheat: GER - USA -.816∗∗ -.693∗∗
[.089] [.096]
Barley: FRA - AUS -.930∗∗ -.666∗∗ -1.022∗∗ -.847∗∗ -.544∗∗ -.588∗∗
[.179] [.196] [.085] [.098] [.084] [.076]
Barley: GER - AUS -1.204∗∗ -1.065∗∗ -.780∗∗ -.663∗∗
[.085] [.075] [.071] [.069]
Rice: PAK - VIE .405∗∗ .163∗∗ .120 .606∗∗ .064 .001
[.075] [.177] [.152] [.126] [.246] [.250]
Rice: PAK - THA 1.813∗∗ 1.875∗∗ .124∗ .178∗
[.156] [.125] [.052] [.077]
Standard errors in squared brackets. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗ p < 0.01
The first and second column for each regime report, respectively, results for profitable trade 1 and
profitable trade 4.
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Table 5: Serial correlation tests - profitable trade 1
Markets pair Adjustment All Sample Regime I Regime II Regime III
Wheat: FRA - USA 1 week .000 .014 .019
4 weeks .000 .432 .727
Wheat: GER - USA 1 week .000 .606
4 weeks .228 .737
Barley: FRA - AUS 1 week .001 .073 .194 .075
4 weeks .102 .539 .615 .217
Barley: GER - AUS 1 week .000 .016 .134
4 weeks .429 .960 .324
Rice: PAK - VIE 1 week .000 .001 .001 .002
4 weeks .023 .333 .626 .249
Rice: PAK - THA 1 week .000 .000 .047
4 weeks .000 .005 .767
N. of rejections 1 week 6 out of 6 2 out of 4 1 out of 5 1 out of 4
N. of rejections 4 weeks 2 out of 6 1 out of 4 0 out of 5 0 out of 4
Overall share of rejections 1/4 weeks 66 % 37.5 % 10 % 10 %
The reported values are the p-values of the Cumby and Huizinga (1992) test. The number of
rejections refers to a 10% significance level.
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Table 6: Serial correlation tests - profitable trade 4
Markets pair Adjustment All Sample Regime I Regime II Regime III
Wheat: FRA - USA 1 week .000 .011 .162
4 weeks .002 .078 .699
Wheat: GER - USA 1 week .000 .558
4 weeks .353 .891
Barley: FRA - AUS 1 week .000 .093 .387 .000
4 weeks .426 .573 .630 .447
Barley: GER - AUS 1 week .000 .081 .005
4 weeks .481 .528 .492
Rice: PAK - VIE 1 week .000 .001 .000 .002
4 weeks .000 .151 .080 .298
Rice: PAK - THA 1 week .000 .000 .026
4 weeks .000 .108 .356
N. of rejections 1 week 6 out of 6 2 out of 4 1 out of 5 3 out of 4
N. of rejections 4 weeks 3 out of 6 0 out of 4 0 out of 5 0 out of 4
Overall share of rejections 1/4 weeks 75 % 25 % 10 % 30 %
The reported values are the p-values of the Cumby and Huizinga (1992) test. The number of




























Figure 3: Quantile Autoregression on E[πTt ]
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Graphical appendix - Not intended for publication
(a) Wheat: FRA - USA (b) Wheat: FRA - USA
(c) Wheat: GER - USA (d) Wheat: GER - USA
Figure 4: The figures on the left refer to profitable trade with 1 week ad-
justment period; the figures on the right refer to profitable trade with 4
weeks adjustment period. The blue, red and green lines are, respectively,
for regime one (spatio-temporal arbitrage), two (temporal arbitrage) and
three (no arbitrage).
40
(a) Barley: FRA - AUS (b) Barley: FRA - AUS
(c) Barley: GER - AUS (d) Barley: GER - AUS
Figure 5: The figures on the left refer to profitable trade with 1 week ad-
justment period; the figures on the right refer to profitable trade with 4
weeks adjustment period. The blue, red and green lines are, respectively,
for regime one (spatio-temporal arbitrage), two (temporal arbitrage) and
three (no arbitrage).
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(a) Rice: PAK - VIE (b) Rice: PAK - VIE
(c) Rice: PAK - THA (d) Rice: PAK - THA
Figure 6: The figures on the left refer to profitable trade with 1 week ad-
justment period; the figures on the right refer to profitable trade with 4
weeks adjustment period. The blue, red and green lines are, respectively,
for regime one (spatio-temporal arbitrage), two (temporal arbitrage) and
three (no arbitrage).
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(a) Wheat: FRA - USA
(b) Wheat: GER - USA
Figure 7: The plots show import and export prices, price differences and
regimes: spatio-temporal arbitrage, temporal arbitrage, and no arbitrage.
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(a) Barley: FRA - AUS
(b) Barley: GER - AUS
Figure 8: The plots show import and export prices, price differences and
regimes: spatio-temporal arbitrage, temporal arbitrage, and no arbitrage.
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(a) Rice: PAK - VIE
(b) Rice: PAK - THA
Figure 9: The plots show import and export prices, price differences and
regimes: spatio-temporal arbitrage, temporal arbitrage, and no arbitrage.
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